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place to place and from year to year. Therefore, if a kinsman has some grass which is good for fattening lambs or restoring weakened ewes, a man may ask him to take some of his weaker animals which are in difficulties. For this service he will have to pay, but he would not in any circumstances trust his sheep to the care of an unrelated shepherd.

But the most intimate form of economic association between kinsmen occurs where a number of autonomous but related families join together for the co-management of their flocks and, in particular, to discover and negotiate for winter pastures. The solution of this problem requires that the group should reach an understanding, whether direct or through an intermediary, with persons of influence in villages and government departments. The leader of such a 'company' is known as the tselingas (ὁ τσέλιγγας). In a majority of cases the nucleus of the group he leads may be descibed as a simple fraternal association, that is a number of married brothers with families, each of whom maintains his own household, his own purse, and has his own animals clearly marked. But, in addition, such groups often include uncles, nephews, brothers-in-law, paternal and maternal cousins, and it would be possible to produce many examples of different combinations of kinsmen and affinal relatives. At this point, it is sufficient to stress that they are founded upon ties of kinship and marriage, that they are voluntary and often unstable associations in which each family retains its own independent social personality, its own budget, and its own animals.

In these ways kinsmen give each other moral and practical support in facing a hostile and competitive world where one man delights openly and with little inhibition in the misfortunes of another. A man co-operates with his kinsmen because he trusts them. There is a sense of security within the kindred which is significantly absent outside its limits. One may not steal from a kinsman's flock, nor cheat him in monetary settlements, nor seduce his sister, nor gossip about his private affairs. But it is necessary to stress that there are definite limits to what may be expected from kinsmen. When honour demands a vengeance killing, kinsmen outside the family will lend moral support but none of them is obliged to pull the trigger or thrust home the knife. Again, money may be loaned between kinsmen

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happens at weddings that quarrels develop between unrelated guests. Insults, curses, and blows are exchanged, and sometimes knives are drawn. These events have a certain pattern. A man is insulted, or imagines that he has been insulted, by another. At once all the relatives of either man range themselves alongside their kinsman; and those who are unrelated to either party, as well as others embarrassed by an equal allegiance to both sides, throw themselves between the two antagonists. But the paternal or maternal origin of relationship neither increases nor diminishes the obligation to support a kinsman in this or any other situation.

Property and prestige are passed from one generation to the next according to customary rules of inheritance in the one case, and canons of popular judgement in the other, which reflect the symmetry of an individual's relations to the families of origin of his father and mother. Property is itself an element in prestige, while wealth without prestige loses its significance. Individual and family reputation, as I have already indicated, is a self-evident value; without it social life has no meaning. This prestige is inherited both from the father's family and the mother's. It is true that the prestige of paternal connexions is greater; but the quality of the mother's family of origin is also critical, for criticism of the mother, who contributes important moral qualities to the characters of her children, is a peculiarly effective method of denigrating a family. The individual, of course, may increase or diminish his reputation by his own acts but it is on the basis of a reputation inherited from both parents that he at first faces the judgements of the community. And if this inherited reputation is unsatisfactory, it will be exceedingly difficult for the individual by his own efforts to redeem it. It is partly for these reasons that the choice of a wife is a matter which is approached with delicacy and deliberation. Many personal qualities of a prospective bride are taken into consideration but invariably the crucial question to be debated is the quality and prestige of the girl's family and close kin. The Sarakatsani use a Turkish word, νταμάρι, of which the primary meaning is a vein, to indicate the general quality of a man's immediate maternal and paternal ancestors.[1] And if either the

[1] The more general meaning of νταμάρι in modern Greek is 'stone quarry'.

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not shown the right attitude of a man under obligation. This, in a sense, is true. For neither side can admit to obligation without losing prestige; and both must attempt to claim the superordinate position in a creditor-debtor relationship.

But a man does not feel any embarrassment in asking for help from a kinsman. In these circumstances there is no shame in being under obligation or a debt of gratitude. Irrespective of the state of the balance of favours and counter favours, collateral relatives of the same generation, by reason of their kinship, are conceptually equal since they are descended from a pair of siblings who, before marriage and apart from the chances of age and sex, were socially equivalent persons. A man does not lose prestige through obligation to a kinsman; on the contrary his reputation is increased, for the community pays attention to a person whose kinsmen lend him immediate and effective support. And for the man who gives aid to his kin, the knowledge that men learn of his actions through the gratitude of the kinsman who receives it, is sufficient recompense. For in this way he wins a reputation as a man of honour 'who supports his kinsmen'. If through wealth or influence a man is in a position to act as a general protector of his kindred, not only is he expected to do so, but this, in most cases, is also his wish. There is some altruism here. A man takes pleasure in the company of his kinsman; he finds him on occasion a source of practical advantage, but in particular he holds to him and has confidence in him simply because he is a kinsman. And for these reasons complaints of ingratitude against kinsmen are relatively few.

But although a man is under a moral obligation to help a collateral relative, this assistance is not given unconditionally. The important consideration is that it must not conflict with the interests of the family. This emerges very clearly in situations of physical violence. A man is not expected to accept responsibility for avenging the death of a collateral kinsman. He will give moral support to the family of the victim but he is unlikely to go farther than that. A vengeance killing leads to the arrest of the killer and a prison sentence, which is sometimes followed by self-imposed exile in another district of Greece when there is any fear of counter vengeance. In this way a shepherd's family might lose its protector at least for some years, perhaps for ever. Only in unusual circumstances where a man feels that his

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honour is very closely identified with the blood of the murdered man is it possible that a cousin, uncle, or nephew may undertake this duty; and there have been no such cases in recent years. In any case such a situation would only arise where the murdered man had no family relative, a brother or even an infant son, who could balance the debt of blood at that time or in the future.

It is quite a different matter when a man is physically attacked in the presence of a kinsman. The latter cannot stand by and do nothing; indeed, it is a personal insult to a man that another should dare to strike his kinsman before his eyes. Fights and brawls are not infrequent; they may happen in coffee-shops when a man is winning too successfully at cards, in a dispute over the boundaries of grazing land, or at a wedding when men drink to excess and see a veiled insult in each word or gesture. Yet these fights seldom lead to a killing. The Sarakatsani are very aware of the consequences of murder and vengeance killing; and even when they seem to be in the grip of ungovernable rage they do not draw a knife unless they see, or sense, that there are witnesses uncommitted by kinship obligation who will prevent them from using it. It is noticeable that in boundary disputes, where two shepherds may sometimes find themselves alone, quarrels are more often decided with iron-hooked shepherds' crooks, capable of ugly but generally not mortal wounds. In a brawl, as distinct from a calculated vengeance killing, a shepherd relies on the active support of a kinsman, for this does no injury to the interests of his family; on the contrary, the family gains honour by action, but loses it by inaction.

We must distinguish between two kinds of favour and service which may be exchanged between collateral kin; and it is, again, the question of responsibility to the family which marks the form of this distinction. In the first instance a man is able to assist his kinsman in a manner which cannot possibly conflict with the interests of his own family or become a charge on its limited resources. Shelter and hospitality, information about the affairs of other people and their gossip, physical support in a brawl, are examples of this kind of assistance. These services are true favours (χάρες) which in a relationship of personal kinship a man is bound to perform. 'We hold to our kindred' (κρατᾶμε

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612 183 in time, and after long consideration, may provide the offender with an excuse. There is no basis for forgiveness and reconciliation.

612 622 The support of kinsmen is also withdrawn sometimes in a manner which does not necessarily imply a permanent rupture of social relations, though it may come to this in the end. I have previously emphasized the importance of the moral support of kinsmen when the community is evaluating a man's conduct. [539] The idea that a man must defend the actions of his kinsmen is expressed in the proverb, 'Ο δικός μπορεῖ νὰ πῇ μὰ δὲν μπορεῖ ν'ἀκούσῃ. Literally this means, 'A relation can speak to his kinsman but he cannot listen to something about him', that is to say he can scold a kinsman for his shortcomings in private, but he will not allow others to accuse him in public. This in general is true, but it depends upon the possibility of advancing some reasonable explanation of a kinsman's conduct. Where a man has behaved in a manner clearly at variance with the values of the community a kinsman is forced to abandon him, and even to take some part in condemning his conduct. For if he continues to support his cause his own reputation and that of his family will suffer. By condemning the actions of his kinsmen he expresses in an unequivocal fashion that he supports the values of the community; and he maintains a measure of social distance between himself and his kinsman. In this way he hopes to avoid the taint of association with his conduct and the shame which accompanies it.

684 612 627 The history of Nasios illustrates this process. One afternoon in the summer of 1953 he happened to meet Mitrina Mastoras on the hill-side above his village, and there, after failing to win her willing co-operation, he attempted to take her 'by force' (μὲ τὸ ζόρι); but unsuccessfully according to Mitrina's story. The terrified woman ran down the hill to the huts of her second cousin for, at the time, her own husband was away from home. The cousin at once sent word to the husband who returned immediately. He surprised Nasios, knocked him to the ground, and had already drawn his knife to settle the matter when he was seized from behind by two villagers. In terror Nasios escaped to his home.

Public opinion was unanimous in condemning Nasios. This was not the first time he had attacked women, although on the

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two previous occasions he had more wisely confined his attentions to gipsy women. His family was in any case poor and of low prestige. There was nothing at all to be said in his favour. He had a number of kinsmen among the Sarakatsani who graze the lands of the same village, and of these the closest was Evangelos Balatsos, a first cousin. Evangelos and the other kinsmen all joined in the universal condemnation of Nasios. During the weeks which followed Evangelos made a point of going each day to the home of Nasios and unnerving him with imaginary accounts of the plots and ambushes which the husband of Mitrina was preparing to lure him to his death. So thorough were his efforts that for the next two months, until the Sarakatsani left for the winter pastures, Nasios was never seen outside his hut in daylight. Evangelos after his daily visits to Nasios made his way to the coffee-shop where he described to an appreciative audience the state of affairs in Nasios's household, how he remained each night, sleepless behind the door with axe in hand, and how his wife was obliged under cover of darkness to remove his faeces from the hut. In this fashion Evangelos took a leading part in the shaming of his kinsman, and saved his own name by denying solidarity with his kinsman and damaging his reputation.

The possibility of losing the moral and practical support of kinsmen, perhaps for ever, is clearly a most powerful sanction of the norms of kinship behaviour and the values of the wider community. If Nasios, a poor man who herded the sheep of villagers, had possessed a substantial flock and had therefore been dependent on the help of kinsmen in a 'company', this estrangement from his kinsmen would have affected him even more seriously than it did. It is also evident that the application of this sanction by the kinsman is itself sanctioned by the threat that a man and his family may lose prestige if he does not temporarily abandon the evil-doer. Since the interests of the family always take precedence over obligations of individual collateral kinship, there is never any doubt that a man will conform. We see, not for the first time, the connexion between prestige values and the isolation of the family; for these values necessarily threaten the solidarity of any personal relationship or social grouping which may conflict with a man's duty to uphold, or promote, the prestige of his family.

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will be said that a man would not lightly or without reason change his mind on so serious a matter if he had not discovered some grave moral or physical deficiency in the girl. No man of worth is likely to choose a girl whom another has previously rejected. She can only hope to marry a widower or a poor man from a despised family. Therefore to break an engagement is a violent affront to the honour of all the members of the bride's family, and as such it carries the ultimate sanction of vengeance killing, which the girl's brothers, if they are men of honour, ought to carry through against the person of the bridegroom. It follows that both for the sake of his honour and prestige in the community, and for very life itself, a man is unlikely to break a betrothal contract. On the other hand, a bridegroom, if he finds out between the betrothal and the marriage (a period of between three months to a year) that he is being tricked into marriage with a particularly ugly or unhealthy girl, may consider himself released from his pledge of honour. It is generally in connexion with incurable diseases such as advanced pulmonary tuberculosis that betrothals are sometimes broken off. It cannot, however, be said that the danger of a broken betrothal deters the girl's family from every kind of trickery or concealment when there is the possibility of marrying off an ugly or unhealthy daughter or sister. The disgrace of a girl remaining unmarried is feared more than the bridegroom's reluctance and its possible consequences.

It is mainly to avoid these risks and difficulties that, today, a bridegroom often will not allow the formal approach to be made to a girl's family until he, or a trusted brother, has had an opportunity of secretly appraising the appearance and bearing of a prospective bride. For the same reasons, families with daughters of marriageable age try to display the more attractive girls and prevent their ugly or sick sisters from being seen at wells or in other public places. When a man wants to view a possible bride, he generally goes to stay at a kinsman's home near to the huts of the girl's family. From the women of his kinsman's family he learns of the girl's daily movements and arranges to be near the well or stream when she goes to draw water or wash clothes. He may watch her secretly from behind cover or may saunter casually past and say 'Good day', to which she will not reply. These antics are unnecessary if the man has

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583 me with pride how she was beaten about the head and body and dragged fifty yards by the hair. The captured girl is taken without delay to a prepared hideout in a cave or forest clearing. Here she is held by the bridegroom for three days and three nights. On the fourth day, the man takes the girl to the nearest police post and gives himself up, explaining that he took the girl from her home because he wished to marry her. The police at once send for the father or brother of the girl, and in his presence the police officer asks her if she wishes to marry her abductor or return to her home. She is asked this question three times and gives her answer three times. If she says that she is willing to marry the man they are taken immediately to the
[123] church and the service is celebrated. If she elects to return home, she is handed over to her kinsmen while the man is held to await trial on a serious charge which may send him to prison
583 for a number of years. It is remarkable that in the five cases of
581 abduction which I discovered amongst the Zagori Sarakatsani, there is only one instance of the girl choosing to return to her own people. During the days and nights when she is detained by her abductor, the situation is carefully explained to her. If she refuses to marry the man, nobody will believe that after three nights in the wilderness with an ardent lover she is any longer a virgin. In any case, she cannot expect to be sought in marriage except by a man of low prestige or a widower.
● [127] Secondly, if she goes back to her family, it inevitably obliges one of her brothers to seek vengeance on the abductor when he emerges from prison. And in this case, the brother in turn may lose his life in counter vengeance or, at least, be forced into voluntary exile. Thirdly, she is asked if it is not pleasant, despite the sudden shocks, to be married to a man who is willing to risk his life to take her as his wife. For these reasons, and especially for the first of them, the girl is more likely to say 'Yes' than 'No'.

583 Abduction, then, is a recognized institution through which,
577 if the normal negotiations between two opposed groups for the arrangement of a marriage break down in a manner detrimental to his social prestige, a man may yet save his reputation and win his bride without necessarily precipitating the two families into acts of reciprocal vengeance. To refuse a bridegroom is to suggest that he is not worthy. The abduction of the

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593 contingency and reciprocity enters into the relationship. A son must give his father respect, be an efficient worker, and above all else show that he is a courageous protagonist of his family. The love and esteem of the father depend on his performance in these matters. By the time a son has returned from his military service, the conditional element in the relationship is increasingly on the side of the son, who avoids showing public disrespect to his father and continues to accept his authority on the understanding that the father, for his [888] part, respects his son's maturing social personality. After the retirement of the father, the sons in the extended family are under an absolute obligation to care for the old man, but the degree of their concern for his comfort may vary according to the past history of their relations. The conditional character of the affection of the father for a daughter is even more pro- [694] nounced. If the girl's reputation for virtue remains unblemished, she receives his favour; if it does not, she may suffer the ulti- 593 mate sanction of death at the hands of her own father. In turn, 584 the attitude of a married daughter to her father is contingent on whether he has given her to a good husband of an honourable [578] family. The daughter of a rich and powerful family, forced against her will to marry her second cousin, swore to her father as she left her home that she would never set foot in it again. Such a case of a complete breach of trust and mutual esteem between father and daughter is rare; but there are also women who harbour resentment against their fathers because, as they allege, they were given to indifferent husbands in order to avoid the payment of a substantial dowry.

3. SIBLINGS

593 The idea of 'one blood' which they share in their common [827] filiation to the same parents is the value that underlies the impressive solidarity of siblings in the elementary family and their almost complete identification of interests. In the eyes of outsiders siblings are morally identified. Whatever, for good or ill, is suffered or achieved by one sibling is held to affect the other siblings to an almost equivalent degree. An insult to any member of the group is felt with the same resentment by all the [627] brothers and sisters. If the brothers are adult, the Sarakatsani believe that an unmarried brother is the right and appropriate person to redress the wrongs of rape and homicide.

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person to redress the wrongs of rape and homicide. The solidarity of siblings is also passive, in the sense that the loss of prestige suffered by an individual on account of his evil or dishonourable acts equally affects his siblings. Therefore, the individual is responsible to his brothers and sisters for whatever he says or does. Only in the context of a vengeance killing do siblings generally escape the liabilities of passive solidarity; for the brother of a homicide is not generally considered to be a legitimate surrogate as an object of vengeance for the victim's family.

The emotional identification of siblings has its origin in the common experiences of early childhood. As children they sleep under the same blanket and eat from the same bowl. Older siblings look after the younger ones and protect them from the bullying of other children. There is an unthinking trust and loyalty. It is rarely possible to persuade an unmarried sibling to pass even a mildly adverse comment about a brother or sister. Usually personal secrets are not entrusted to anybody but a sibling of the same sex. Sisters discuss their fears and hopes of marriage, a subject which it would be shameful to mention even to their mother. Brothers share each other's anxieties about personal animosities and imagined insults.

The sympathy and emotional identification of sisters emerge with poignancy on the day of a girl's marriage. The unmarried sisters whom the bride leaves behind display a grief which in its public aspect is certainly conventionally expected, but for some days after the wedding they seem even within the privacy of the family hut to be stunned by the loss of their sister's accustomed presence. Sisters sense the dread and apprehension which the bride herself feels when she leaves the protective circle of her family to be given into the care of strangers. The violent shock of the sexual assault is also in their thoughts.

Unmarried brothers work together in service to the family flock. They are conscious that the physical survival of the family as well as its prestige depend in the last resort on the animals. This common dependence and service to the flock is another ground for their close identification. They do not work (as is the case in the co-operation of cousins or married brothers with separate households) with one eye on their partner to make sure that he is not shirking his share of the work. The mutual

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593 578 with mutual insult. If it did, it is very likely to end all forms of co-operation. But if the parents of the brothers are still alive, even a quarrel of these dimensions may sometimes be healed.

593 The ties between unmarried sisters are particularly close. If dishonour attaches to one sister, it infects them all. Together, passively and modestly, they await with anxiety for some stranger to ask for their hand, an event which is both dreaded and desired. Unlike the brothers who separate to carry out their different work, the sisters are constantly in one another's company and are often working together at the same task. Their relationship differs from that of brothers in the absence of any considerable rivalry. While brothers stand in the public gaze, sisters are closeted within the privacy of domestic life. [539 836] The reputation of a girl does not depend upon positive self-assertion, but rather on the passive preservation of her virginal condition. She succeeds in this through the closest possible association with her sisters; their physical inseparability is her chief defence against the slander of enemies. Differences in [578 582] physical beauty may cause some jealousy but these are facts which cannot be altered and, since sisters in any case marry strictly in order of seniority, competition to snare a husband [461] does not exist. The absence of competitive attitudes between sisters means that any elaborate fiction of differentiated roles is unnecessary, and sisters work happily and amicably at the same task without any serious comparison of productivity or skill.[4]

The ties between brother and sister are also close. Here again, from the viewpoint of the outsider, brothers and sisters are identified as children of the same parents; the short-comings of a sister reflect upon the brother, and vice versa. But the difference of sex introduces into the relationship an important [627] element of complementarity. The brother is the guardian of his sister from rape and insult and he must avenge any violation [584] of her person or character. If his father has retired, it is the duty of the eldest brother, with his father's consent and guidance, to [582] arrange for his sister an honourable marriage. And the youngest brother in a sibling group must remain unmarried until all the sisters have been settled.

[4] Young sisters or cousins sometimes compete to see who can spin more quickly than the other. And they mark a cross on the forehead of the loser with a piece of charcoal. But these are games played in an atmosphere of great hilarity and goodwill.

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But the obligation that Sarakatsani must not on any account fail to fulfil is the defence of family honour. Honour (τιμή) is directly concerned in a limited range of situations; typically these emerge after physical assault or verbal insult, or following a sexual assault on the women of a family, or their own misconduct. Whether or not honour is lost depends essentially upon two qualities in the moral characters of its members; the manliness (ἀνδρισμός) of the men, and the sexual shame (ντροπή) of the women. Objectively, therefore, honour is an aspect of the integrity and social worth of the family as this is judged by the community; subjectively it represents the moral solidarity of the family, an ideal circle that must be defended against any violation by outsiders.

Honour is concerned with strength or prepotency rather than justice. The most direct blow to the strength of another family is simply to kill one of its men. His blood pours out and with it go life, consciousness, and strength. Sarakatsani believe that in some way a killer absorbs the strength from the blood of the man he slays. 'I shall drink your blood' (θὰ σοῦ πιῶ τὸ αἷμα), is a phrase that threatens murder. Given the connexion between strength and honour, it follows that the family of the killer validates its claim to honour, except in circumstances where the motive of the killing is itself dishonourable; such motives of dishonour include sexual lust but not theft. On the other hand, the family of the victim must remain inferior until one of its members 'takes out the blood' (βγάλῃ τὸ αἷμα) from the violator himself, or until he is at least driven into exile. One avenger bathed his hands in the blood of the original killer and returned to show his mother 'the blood of her son'. With certain qualifications that will concern us in a later chapter, all Sarakatsani are born with honour. But it is constantly threatened; and its conservation is, in effect, a struggle to maintain an ideal equality. When a life or the virtue of a woman has been taken away, something equivalent must be taken back if the family is not to fall for ever from grace and social reputation.

The family of the victim, then, have this duty of active solidarity[3] 'to take out the blood' of their kinsman from the

[3] The useful distinction between active and passive solidarity is borrowed from Glotz. See Gustave Glotz, *La Solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce*, Paris, 1904, Chapter 6.

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596 577 ● 627 person of his violator. On the other hand, the family of the original killer do not have to suffer the consequences of passive solidarity; a brother, father, or son of the killer is not generally an object of vengeance. But despite the absence of passive solidarity in vengeance killing, the ideal course of a vendetta is still visualized as terminating in the mutual extinction of the two families. As we shall see, this is most unlikely to occur in practice. It is generally to a brother or son, more especially the former, that the duty of vengeance killing for murder falls. A father is seldom involved, for women and children are inviolate, and only in the case of the killing of an only son without issue will he be left as the one possible avenger. Normally, an unmarried brother avenges a brother, a son his father, when the latter has no unmarried brother.

During the period 1945–55 it seems that only two successful killings have occurred amongst the Sarakatsani that were specifically vengeance for a previous murder, although for the same period I have details of varying completeness concerning seven other killings for various causes (other than the hostilities of the 1947–9 civil war). One reason for the low incidence of vengeance killing is that the killer is generally removed or removes himself from the scene of action immediately after the event. Today, the Greek police are well organized and omni-
[578] present. Generally, killings occur either as the result of boun-
[682] dary disputes or questions of honour, so that the identity of a killer is widely known. He is quickly arrested and finds asylum in prison. When he is released from prison some five to ten years later, his kinsmen will advise him whether the victim has a brother or son able to revenge him, and depending on the nature of this advice the killer will either return to the community or move to another district of the Epirus or to Thessaly. Therefore, in most cases, the absence of passive solidarity in blood vengeance and the removal of the killer to prison and later to voluntary exile prevents the execution of vengeance. Exile is clearly not so honourable an outcome as a vengeance killing for the victim's family, but it strikes some kind of rough balance between the two groups. It relieves the avenger of the need to spend a number of years in prison, followed possibly by exile. The killer himself is believed to suffer considerably in his exile, distant from the support of his family and kinsmen. And it is the

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reputation for manliness of the victim's group which has driven him there.

But if all the dead man's brothers are married, he is unlikely to be avenged. A married brother's obligations to his own family take precedence. If he were to kill the murderer he would be removed to prison, and afterwards would face exile or possible counter-vengeance. In either event his family would be deprived of its head at a time when the sons were almost certainly still children or adolescents. Yet the consciences of married men with an unavenged brother are never altogether easy. If the dead man has a son, however young, they feel less troubled. For this son will be expected to revenge his father before he marries. However, by the time the son is mature enough to act, the killer is probably an old man and removed from the public scene. In this situation a son tends to put off the execution of his duty in the hope that the murderer will soon die naturally without his assistance.

If the dead man has an unmarried brother, ideally the latter may not marry until the murderer has been killed or driven into exile. But if the dead man has also a son, even though it is still in the cradle, he will probably take a wife; particularly if the killer has a long sentence to serve. If the dead man has no son, an unmarried brother will certainly wait until the murderer emerges from prison, but if the latter does not then return to the community the brother will probably consider himself free to marry a year or two afterwards.

Yet despite the dearth of reciprocal vengeance killings, the idea of this obligation is very real, and it remains a potent sanction against light-hearted killings in a community with a taste for violence. Of five Sarakatsan murderers released from prison in recent years, three moved to other parts of Greece, and the two who returned to the community only did so because their victims had left no ready avenger on the scene.

The details of a vengeance killing which occurred in 1950 illustrate some aspects of the problem. During the civil war of 1947–9 the Sarakatsani were unable to reach their summer grazing in the mountains and remained in the plains of Thesprotia under conditions of extreme heat and absence of grass. There was a boundary dispute between the extended family group of Achnoulas and a 'company' of families led by

John Stratos.

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John Stratos. Accused of stealing the grass of the other group, a young shepherd of the Achnoulas family insulted a brother of John Stratos, who struck him with his crook. Both families heard the shouts and rushed to the aid of their kinsmen. In the scuffle that followed the old father of John Stratos was wounded by the knife of one of his own sons which had fallen to the ground and was then picked up by one of the Achnoulas brothers. He died from the wound. The fight was so confused, with six men grappling in a body, that the Stratos family never discovered which Achnoulas brother killed the old man. Nor did the police. After a lengthy inquiry, nobody was charged with the killing since much of the evidence appeared to suggest that it had been accidental. The Achnoulas family felt reasonably secure from direct attack because of the anonymity of the killer and nothing happened for nine months, until one day George Achnoulas, drunkenly quarrelling at a wedding, told an adversary to take care, hinting darkly that he was not afraid of spilling blood since it would not be the first time. The Stratos family, informed of this incident, necessarily accepted the evidence as sufficient, and an unmarried brother, Charalambos, waited in ambush for George and shot him dead as he walked along a path.

What we are faced with in these seeming evasions, or half evasions, of a duty which is declared to be sacred, is generally not any real weakness in the solidarity of the family of origin, but the conflict of roles between the duty of the brother or son on the one hand, and, on the other, the obligations of a father to his own family, or the right of a brother or son to marry and found his own elementary family at about the age of thirty. This conflict is, of course, related to the bilateral form of the kindred and the isolated corporate family which is associated with it. It places an inherent limit on vendetta. Clearly, a community fragmented into family commonwealths, where the individual's categorical rights and obligations are contained exclusively in this small group, where the help a man can claim from his collateral kin is severely limited, and where a family to exist in any real sense must have at least one adult male to support and lead it, is peculiarly ill contrived to prosecute blood vengeance.

It is, then, not inconsistent with these considerations that the

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It is, then, not inconsistent with these considerations that the Sarakatsani have no notions about the blood or spirit of an unavenged victim turning upon the kinsmen who have failed in their duties. For this would be an uncomfortable belief to accommodate where successful vengeance killing is contingent on a number of circumstances. This is interesting because, as we have already seen, blood is the material medium of kinship and its values. In other related contexts Sarakatsani clearly believe that blood has mysterious and intelligent powers. A horse standing outside a house when its master was murdered 'dropped dead from the blood' (ἔσκασε ἀπὸ τὸ αἷμα). A shepherd who killed a woman 'was seized by the blood' (τὸν ἔπιασε τὸ αἷμα). He was paralysed before his victim until the husband returned to kill him. For this was an evil and unnatural deed where supernatural sanctions rightly operated. Sarakatsani will even say that the avenging brother's blood gives him the courage to reclaim 'his own blood' from the killer. But suggestions that a dead man might be personally angry and dangerous if he is not avenged are met with amused and pragmatic disbelief. If care is taken over a man's burial so that the Devil cannot use him as a 'βρυκόλακας' (phantom), a dead man is simply dead. Vengeance, then, is a duty owed to the honour of the family and not to the memory of a particular individual. And honour depends on the strength, confidence, and self-regard of living men, not on any mysterious or spiritual powers.

The problems which the duty of vengeance killing presents to a family sometimes have an element of paradox. For in prosecuting vengeance and defending its honour a family almost inevitably deprives itself of one of its men. This may represent a dangerous weakening of its strength; and strength, it may be remembered, is the basis of honour. In the very act of defending one's honour one may in fact be jeopardizing it. The violator is always in mortal danger immediately after the deed, when grief and humiliation are fresh. But if he survives the first two years unscathed the victim's family begin to consider the situation in a more calculating and unemotional fashion. It then becomes a question rather of whether there are reasonable grounds, of the kind we have discussed, for 'not' prosecuting vengeance. This depends entirely on how the community views their predicament. If all the brothers of the victim are married when the killer returns from prison, the consensus

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of opinion is likely to be favourable to a policy of inaction but mutual avoidance. There is, inevitably, some loss of prestige but this may be the lesser of two evils. But mutual avoidance (which is possible in this dispersed community) is essential. If the killer were to appear before the victim's brothers on a public occasion, such as a wedding or a festival, the humiliating confrontation would force the brothers to kill him or forfeit their honour. Generally, both sides have strong motives to keep out of each other's way. In the case of the vengeance killing between the Achnoulas and Stratos families, after some months the Stratos family may have felt relief that they did not know the identity of the killer. But the incident at the wedding was generally interpreted as a display of public boasting by George Achnoulas, and this made retaliation almost inevitable.

The loss of a life in a killing is seen as a loss of blood, and for this outrage the violator ought to pay with his own blood. We have shown that there is no passive solidarity in vengeance killing; a man does not generally suffer for a killing committed by his brother. This is a convention which plainly restricts the possible extensions of a vengeance killing and prevents a number of families from losing their 'protectors'. It is the analogue of those qualifications of active solidarity that we have already discussed. However, this does not detract from the importance of active and passive solidarity in other situations nor the significance of the shedding of the common blood. This is very evident in fights which do not involve homicide.

An evenly contested fight in which no blood is spilled is an episode complete in itself; a fight of similar character and proportions in which one side physically loses blood but the other does not, inevitably provokes its own sequel in the attempt at some later time to draw blood from the opponent. But a man does not himself revenge the outrage which has been committed on him. This is the task of a brother or son. Also, the object of vengeance need not be the original opponent; any male member of this man's family is appropriate. In a typical dispute over the boundaries of grazing areas, Aristoteles was cut about the head by the other shepherd's crook. Some weeks later, Christos, the brother of Aristoteles, found himself at a wedding feast opposite the brother of the man who had recently quarrelled with his own brother. In his own words, 'I suddenly saw

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him there, drinking and putting on airs. I remembered that his brother Vasili drew blood from my brother. I could not stand it.' The consequences for the other man was a head wound from a broken bottle before the two men were parted and expelled from the wedding. It has to be remembered that fights and brawls in which individuals have the duty of both active and passive solidarity are relatively frequent, but that killings are rare.

The second category of affairs of honour concerns the sexual conduct of women. The family has exclusive rights over the sexual capacities of its women, and in this respect women always remain *in loco filiae*. Here we are concerned not only with external attack as in the spilling of blood, but also, sometimes, with treason from within when a daughter or sister betrays her virginity or when a wife voluntarily commits adultery. The will of a woman is vulnerable and her sensuality is evil. She is the weak link in the chain. For this very reason her sexual purity is an appropriate symbol of the family's honour. Its destruction, although itself a dishonourable act, in some way places the destroyer and his family in a position of superiority; for they have demonstrated that the woman is willing to abandon sacred loyalties for the gratification of her sensual feelings by a stranger. In these circumstances vengeance becomes primarily an act of purification. A father (or brother) must first destroy his daughter (or sister) and only afterwards turn his attention to the lover. Similarly, a husband ought first to kill a wife taken in adultery and then the paramour.

If it seems surprising that such violence may occur in a group whose jural and affective solidarity I have been at some pains to stress, this nevertheless seems to be a characteristic of small groups whose solidarity is very intense. In the mutual identification of one member with another, there is no flexibility to contain widely divergent interests. We have seen that brothers, if they cannot reach unanimous decisions, must part company. Similarly, the association of family members demands absolute loyalty; the treachery of one member disrupts the group in such a way that this member's very presence is a denial of the qualities and attitudes on which the harmony of its internal relations depends. The objectionable element must, therefore, be excised. This is the only way in which the family honour can be

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reinstated. And the father[4] or brother who accomplishes this terrible work wins a grudging respect in the general community.

Families do not always find at once the moral strength to take the only honourable action. In an affair between two second cousins in 1955 near a village on Mitsikeli, the girl's brothers first tried unsuccessfully to kill her lover. The girl then ran away to the man's home; no doubt as much through fear of her family as out of devotion to her lover. In another case, which occurred in 1944, the lover of an unmarried girl escaped from the neighbourhood after one unsuccessful attempt to shoot him. Although the girl's association with the man had been notorious, no action was at first taken against her, but over a period of six months the family suffered acutely from public sneers and scorn until, quite suddenly, the girl disappeared. The nature of her fate was never satisfactorily explained.

The most recent instance of the vengeance of a family on a daughter occurred in 1948 when a Sarakatsanos wintering his sheep near the Gulf of Arta discovered that his daughter was conducting an affair with a villager, who had seduced her with false promises of marriage. At the time, there was no other Sarakatsan family in the immediate neighbourhood, so that there seemed to be some possibility of hushing up the matter; but the girl discovered that she was pregnant, and the man refused to marry her.[5] The father took the girl to a secluded place, shot her with a pistol, and disposed of her body by rowing out into the gulf and sinking it with weights attached. Later, he killed the villager and dealt with his body in the same way. This case is often cited as the right solution to problems of this kind.

In cases where a girl is raped or a wife is similarly violated, or where at least the community accepts this presentation of the matter, the action is one of straightforward vengeance. The natural avenger is the brother for a sister and a husband for a wife. Such an attempt will certainly be made where an avenger is available, and it will be recalled that in the case of unmarried girls one of the brothers does not marry until all the sisters are

[4] It seems to be the opinion that the father who begot the girl is a more appropriate executioner than the brother.

[5] Marriage is not an honourable solution to a premarital affair unless, as is most unlikely, the liaison is known only to the two families, and not to the community.

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established in marriage, an arrangement which expressly provides them with this avenger. Consequently, in cases where an act of vengeance concerns the sexual honour of a sister or a wife, there is little chance of it not being executed through default of a ready avenger.

A question of honour is also involved when a man breaks the contract of betrothal. The girl's brother ought to kill him. Here the attack on the girl and her family is not a physical assault upon her virginity, but the suggestion that in this or some other respect she is not worthy of marriage. And the knowledge that the breaking of the contract involves an obligation of vengeance only establishes more strongly in the minds of other members of the community the suspicion that there must exist some serious fault in the girl. I know of only two instances of broken betrothals over a period of ten years and significantly both these cases were arrangements between Sarakatsan girls and village men. Marriages between Sarakatsani are only arranged after exhaustive inquiry and considerable debate; mistakes are thus unlikely. In the first of these two cases, the former bridegroom fled to Athens after he had lost the top of a finger in an unsuccessful attempt on his life; in the second case, the father of the unhappy girl had no adult son, and was glad enough to have the additional excuse that the man lived some considerable distance away. He was loud in his threats, but in the event he did nothing; and people were quick to point out that this was exactly the kind of conduct one might have expected from this particular individual.

Between the two categories of 'affairs of honour' which I have described there is one important difference. In the first category, a killing demands a counter killing, and in theory, at least, this process may continue until all the adult male members of the two families have exterminated one another. The first killing which initiates the affair is not itself a random or indiscriminate act. It happens generally as the reply to an insult or as the consequence of a boundary dispute or some other quarrel. A man does not intend to kill in these situations, but accidents happen. The rough balance which in most cases, as we have seen, is struck between the two sides, satisfies neither group. The community remains relatively indifferent to questions of 'right' and gives its preference to the side which shows the greater manliness.

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596 the greater manliness. In the second category, however, where
577 an affair concerns the sexual honour of a woman, the community
627 strongly upholds the 'right', in an ethical sense, of a family to
684 kill a man who has assaulted one of its women. For this act is
626 evil and dishonourable. An avenger in an affair of the second category does not generally go into exile, since his life is to a degree protected by public opinion. Where a balance is struck between the two groups in affairs of family honour, it is inherently less stable in cases of the first category than in those of the second. And this appears in the fact that two families, between whom there is a killing and an exile, are extremely careful to avoid meeting in circumstances where their presence may represent an affront to one another. Mutual avoidance is a means of preventing the disturbance of a precarious equilibrium. It appears, then, that the processes of vengeance provide through exile a sanction against killing, and through vengeance killing a sanction against breaches of the code of sexual behaviour.

596 When a man is killed or a woman is assaulted something, a
579 life or honour, is taken away, not merely from the violated
627 individual, but more importantly from his family. One group has committed a wanton and hostile act upon the other, and between the two groups a debt of honour now exists. Something has been taken, something equivalent must be taken back. Until some kind of a balance is re-established, the victim's family is in the eyes of the community inferior to the group of the violator, even where the act of outrage, as in the case of sexual assault, is in itself evil.

It is a peculiarity of 'affairs of honour' that they consist of at least two events between which some interval of time elapses. The first is the violation of family honour which is generally an outrage on one particular member; the second is the act of vengeance which is similarly performed, in most cases, by one member only. In both instances the individual as victim or avenger represents his family. If the honour of the individual and the honour of the family are analytically separable, in [557] action they are one. And if the execution of vengeance brings a measure of personal glory to the individual, at the same time it is also an act which is essentially altruistic.

[558] The longer the interval of time between the two events the

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less effective is the response. To some extent this is so even where the reasons for delay are physical: for instance, the killer is in prison, or the avenger is not yet adult. But it is said that if an affront to honour remained unanswered over a period of years after an adult unmarried avenger was available and the killer physically present in the community, then the quality of the dishonour ascribed to the family would be such that an eventual vengeance killing would not reinstate the reputation of the victim's family. For, on grounds of damaging conjectures about the personal motives for this delay, other families would be able to continue asserting the relative integrity of their own honour by denying it to the family of the victim. The case is hypothetical since there has been no instance of this kind in recent years, but it is indicative of Sarakatsan thinking on this matter.

The defence of family honour is at once an indication of family solidarity and a process which recreates it. The honour of the family, the solidarity of this group, and the mutual responsibility of its members, are correlated notions. It is true that passive solidarity does not extend to questions of vengeance where a life is demanded, but in other respects it is complete. A man may suffer physical assault for the offence of his father, brother, or son. Further, if one member of a family acts dishonourably, all the other members of the family lose honour in the eyes of the community. If a man is killed or a sister's betrothal is broken, and the family remains inactive, all its members are equally dishonoured. Since all are responsible for the actions of any one, every member is accountable to every other member. All the members of the family necessarily form a single solidary group for the protection of their common honour.

2. HOSTILITY BETWEEN UNRELATED FAMILIES

In the preceding chapters we have seen that for each individual this community is divided into the two opposite but complementary categories of kinsmen and strangers; trust marking relations in the one category, distrust in the other. Distrust prevents co-operation between shepherds who are not kinsmen or affines, and the four or five men that are necessary to manage a flock are either father and sons or a co-operative 'company' of kinsmen and relatives by marriage. Moreover, the produce of the

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is something impermanent, almost fortuitous, about the local neighbourhood whether in summer or winter.[1] At the same time the significance and solidarity of the total Sarakatsan community is emphasized. The expression, 'we, the Sarakatsani of Zagori' is common; but 'we, the Sarakatsani of Tsepelevo' (or any other village), is heard less frequently.

Yet it is in the local neighbourhood that hostility between Sarakatsani and Zagori villagers is actively expressed. Property rights are jealously guarded, and in the absence of fencing it is inevitable that Sarakatsan sheep and mules are discovered in the crops or gardens of villagers. They trespass regularly and deliberately on certain areas of grassland reserved for the cutting of hay on which the villagers rely to feed their livestock during the winter months. The shepherds also attempt to defraud the village treasury by concealing some of their sheep when the flock is numbered each spring. For their part the Sarakatsani resent the fines they must pay in the agricultural court for the depredations committed by their animals. They believe, too, that they are cheated in the allotment of watering time by the villager who regulates the irrigation of village vegetable gardens. There are quarrels over the regulations for the grazing and watering of mules, which favour the villagers. There is trouble over the use of springs for washing clothes and over the refusal of the Sarakatsani to use earth-closets. Indeed, there is trouble between the two groups at every point of contact between them. Since their rights are entrenched by the decrees passed in the village council and because the executive administration of village affairs is necessarily in the hands of villagers who are in residence all the year, the villagers are almost always in a legally secure position in differences with Sarakatsani. It follows that the villager appeals to the law which happens to favour his interests, the Sarakatsanos more often turns to self-help and violence. Justice is not a question of the impartial administration of existing law, although this, too, may be lacking in the view of the Sarakatsani. If the law does not allow a man to protect the interests and dignity of his family, then it does not represent justice.

[1] In this connexion it is worth remarking that before the Sarakatsani became village citizens in 1938 a family, or stani, did not necessarily go to the same grazing village in Zagori each year.

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already been examined: homicide, the drawing of blood, verbal insult, seduction, rape, and broken betrothal.

Honour, then, is a condition of integrity, of being 'untouched' by this kind of attack, insult, or betrayal. The integrity of a family and its equality (at least) of status is recognized when others take care not to give offence in these particular ways. If they do gratuitously commit an outrage against a family, they make it clear that they consider its social existence of no account. In that case, whether the violation is accidental or not, the outraged family must answer at once, and with violence, if its reputation is to survive.

But honour is not only to be considered in terms of the various external situations where it may be lost. The intrinsic principles of honour refer to two sex-linked qualities that distinguish the ideal moral characters of men and women: these are the manliness (ἀνδρισμός) of men, and the sexual shame (ντροπή) of women. With the exception only of persons of the lowest lineage, all Sarakatsani are assumed to possess these qualities 'by nature', although in the fallen condition of this world a reputation for manliness or shame is easily lost. In this sense it is not difficult for a man to move in a direction opposite to the true inclinations of his nature. One aspect of honour, then, is a struggle of self-discipline over cowardice and sensuality, flaws of animal nature that continually threaten to limit the natural nobility of man.

In general, the qualities of manliness are obvious and familiar. 'To be a man' the individual must show himself to be courageous and fearless. He must be strong in body and spirit. But there is also a nuance of meaning peculiar to a community where values are agonistic and social reputation is frequently at risk. In these circumstances a man must have boundless self-confidence in his own powers. Where few men owe him more than conditional support, and the great majority none at all, he must rely on himself. Manliness implies not only the condition of being courageous but the ability of a man to do something efficient and effective about the problems and dangers which surround him. For in this complex of values results count for almost everything and intentions for very little.

The physical characteristics of manliness are important. A man must be βαρβᾶτος, that is, well endowed with testicles and the strength that is drawn from them.

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he did nothing. In due course, the girl was abducted and agreed to marry Christos out of terror at the threats made by the Kazoukas family against her own people if she did not consent.

Self-regard is a subjective and personal sentiment. At the same time the situations which provoke it are socially defined. All those elements of prestige, whether of the individual or the family, affect it and are sanctioned by it. A man's self-regard leads him to conserve his honour, to act honourably, to strive after wealth, to act proudly and arrogantly and so on. Self-regard inhibits any conduct on which an interpretation of weakness may be placed. For instance, the Sarakatsani seldom accept or give apologies. 'A pardon is not acceptable' (δὲν πιάνεται τὸ παρντόν), it is said. Similarly, bargaining between a shepherd and a livestock merchant is extremely difficult because the self-regard of the seller will not allow him to accept a price which he thinks other men will laugh at, even though he may admit to himself that in relation to the state of the market and the condition of his stock the merchant's offer is not unreasonable. For this reason a merchant employs a Sarakatsanos[1] who from his local knowledge advises him how far each man may be pressed in negotiation. It is also his task to assure the shepherd that he has made a good bargain. It is self-regard, again, that prevents a Sarakatsanos from reaching a settlement out of court when his animals have trespassed on other people's land. He prefers to go to law knowing in advance that he must pay double the costs of a private agreement. Any compromise would be an admission of weakness in a personal confrontation. Defeat in the courts, on the other hand, is merely defeat by the power of the impersonal State apparatus, which in any case, it is agreed, is corrupt and inimical to the interests of the community.

Self-regard is a kind of appetitive tension between what a man is and what he ought to be. In this context, however, what a man is depends on the evaluation by the community of what a man is alleged to be, or to have done. The need of a man, socially and psychologically, to identify the community's evaluation of himself with his own ideal image is so great that

[1] Known as a πελαοῦζος, a guide.

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honour, and one man in the role of married leader whose prudence and self-control secures its material strength. This possibility depends on the number of sons in a family and the stage of its development. Yet in the critical and unfriendly view of others a family must always be in a position to defend itself against outrage. Weakness is shameful and circumstances never excuse it. The corollary to this notion is that, within limits, it is normally preferable to insult than to be insulted, to exploit than to be exploited.

The emphasis on strength appears in the importance, in moral judgements, of health, effectiveness (δραστηριότης), skill and cleverness. Skill conserves material strength; animals are less likely to become diseased, inferior pastures are not chosen. A man ought to be 'able' in the sense of able to provide, and he needs cleverness of the kind that foresees future threats in time. Health is imperative in this scheme of things; chronic sickness or deformity is inexcusable. There is little sentimentality. Questions of honour are not complicated by notions of chivalrous conduct. An honour killing is accomplished without warning by a bullet fired from behind cover, or a knife in the back. This does not mean that Sarakatsani are cowards; they are, in fact, immensely brave. But, continually, the accent is on effective action, the achievement of success, the avoidance of failure. Ends matter more than means. Consequently, those qualities and attributes that are necessary for strength tend to be considered as morally good, those that lead to weakness as morally bad. Sarakatsani would condemn any display of excessive altruism on the grounds that it inevitably weakens a person's own family and strengthens the family of another; it would be, at best, imprudent, and in a situation where it clearly damaged the interests of the family it would be immoral.

Strength and prowess, then, matter more than ethical goodness. Indeed a man is only good when he is also by implication, able and strong. Although aimless violence is dishonourable there is no missing the pleasure it gives when a man is forced to kill; nor the prestige which it brings him. For there is no more conclusive way of showing that you are stronger than by taking away the other man's life.

The form of this system of values is related to three features of the social structure: the first of these is the complementary

3: Kabbadias EH14 Sarakatsani EH14

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[For additional information on the role of "arbiters" in the settlement of disputes, see Category 692.]

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621 One should not lose sight of a fact which we have already repeated
602 many times, namely that the Sarakatsani generally live /133/ in small isolated groups in the mountains or on the plains in the midst of a society they are unwilling to accept. It is therefore not astonishing that they seek to establish a system of security based on internal solidarity and collaboration among themselves and that these two forms of social integration depend, in turn, on kinship through affinity. However, it is necessary to demonstrate this.

627 Kinship imposes obligation. The study of vendetta among the
62 Sarakatsani will show us that this form of punishment cannot be applied
602 among kin. It will show us also that when a vendetta starts it often ends only when two members of the rival families marry. Another observation should be added in connection with an expression the Sarakatsani use to designate those who do not belong to their family, the symbolic significance of which is unmistakable: "people" enter into the circle of kinship, hostility is liable to change to a certain amity. The "people" become "we."

602 However, both the number of blood relatives and that of affinal relatives is limited. Moreover, the creation of kinship by affinity is not always possible.

608 In response to the overwhelming necessity of insuring loyal allies
182 and collaborators, they resort to fraternization. That this practice,
[171] which is, moreover, not uniquely Sarakatsani but common to all the shepherds all over Greece, aims at such an effect the ethnographer D. Loucopoulos affirms without reservation. (15)

15. Ibid., p. 211

According to him, "this custom was practiced chiefly during village fairs. The religious ritual concluded, the stavradelphia left the church, and publicly, with songs, drinking bouts and banquets made known to all that they had become brothers. This encouraged friends and intimidated enemies."

[124] Our Sarakatsani informants, having always expressed an identical

/166 cont./

596 562 In relation to the men, the women are considered inferior.

The dichotomy according to sex, noted with regard to the conjugal family, exists also, in even more pronounced form in the extended family where men and women constitute different groups, separated and arranged hierarchically.

[535] [596] It is not only the division of tasks which illustates and demonstrates this, but all the phases of daily life, such as festivals in which men and women dance separately, and magico-religious practices in which rites are performed which differ according to the sex of the performers.

* * * *

596 882 554 [627] [535] The young men esbody the virile element and the pride of the family. They must distinguish themselves by their "spirit," both in difficult moments, as well as during festivals. They are the ones who take charge of the vendetta, and of the defense of pastures against encroachment, flocks against thieves and of the men against bandits. And they are the ones who will lead the dance, competing with each other in the execution of priouettes and movements full of harmony and masculine ardor. Moreover, there are manifestations of a magico-religious order in which the protagonists are young men, who thus become the movers of forces favorable to the group. Finally, they represent productive forces in their work and, as future husbands and fathers of families, they guarantee the continuity of the lineage and of the family.

596 554 However, for them, too, seniority on the one hand and kinship on the other, represent the criteria by which they are placed in the social heirarchy within this same family framework.

* * * *

596 In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize another significant aspect of the life style of the extended family, which has to do with festivals and with religious and magical practices.

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474 554 578 Dissatisfactions and disagreements sometimes arise between the Tséligas and the participants. Likewise, his management may provoke controversies.

(629) To cope with these difficulties, arbitration is provided; each party proposes one or two other Tséligas as arbiters, and the sentence pronounced is obligatory for everyone. The chapter devoted to Sarakatsani law will give us all the details of this.

474 596 571 On the other hand, the daily life of the families belonging to the Tséligato changes in no way except for the fact that they have ceased to be isolated. Their interior functioning continues to remain the same. It is only /181/ that thereafter their members have the opportunity to develop social relations (friendships, congenialities, as well as hatreds and dislikes) with a greater number of individuals. Thus, social life becomes more intense.

474 596 554 For the headmen of families, responsibilities weigh less heavily. The Tséligas is always there to assume them in the name of all. Since they represent the link between their family group and the head, they receive instructions and benefits from him and, twice a year, before the change of location, "accounts are settled with him." Then, should the occasion arise, the Tséligas must "give an account of his management of the family enterprise associated with the Tséligato" to the members of the family, of which they are in charge.

474 883 (621) The communal defence against wolves, bandits and trespassing devolves upon all the young men of the Tséligato, who must act collectively, aided if necessary by all the able-bodied men. The Tséligato is a community which its members must all defend together, whether the individual or possessions are threatened.

596 629 A vendetta, on the other hand, remains a family affair. The other participants do not involve themselves in it.

/199 cont./

671 the Church is always there to excommunicate a traitor.
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[688]

Thus we can say that Turkish law, public or private, exerted only a very relative influence on our herders.

671 Public law of privileged communities does not concern the Sarakatsani,
●627 for they have never been part of these. When commercial or simple
692 economic transactions cause differences they can be solved by recourse to arbiters.

As we shall see, the Sarakatsani very much prefer, above all others, this type of legal process which goes back to a very distant past. (5)

[113] 5. See J. Walter Jones: The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks /cited in English/, pp. 130-133, citing also Harell: Public Arbitration in Athenian Law /cited in English/, pp. 1-42.

671 If, in spite of all, they are obliged to apply to local Hellenic
199 justice, customs remain valid before the latter. Sarakatsani customs, too, can thus be enforced.

Now it is certain that the Sarakatsani need comply only occasionally with local laws. If one remembers, in particular, that the disagreements brought about by transactions with the outside appear only rarely, that the sector "trade" covers only a very small part of Sarakatsani economic life, and finally that this sector touches only very superficially their social life in general, one will understand that even in cases where the law, either ecclesiastical or local, ultimately intervenes, this intervention cannot cause any important repercussions in the social sphere.

671 It follows therefore that Sarakatsani law as such has had every
[198] opportunity to develop and above all to develop autonomously during this period.

This in only a negative aspect result of the way external law functions. But there is more, and it is suitable to throw light on the positive results as well.

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474 675 691 initiative, which nonetheless develops in the context of Sarakatsani society and its cultural system.

The agents of ajudication, of sanction and coercion.

578 691 The elements of the problem: daily life and therefore all the questions relating to marriage, kinship and the functioning of the family, as well as the removal of the head, the checking of accounts of the family management and of the Tséligato, claims and quarrels between members and the Tséligas, the settling of various questions pertaining to guardianship, the division of an inheritance and so forth, create and represent numerous cases in which conflicts and litigations may arise.

578 627 692 691 Now all these questions must be solved one way or another. Though the agents of ajudication are multiple they are not always obvious. The same is true for the agents of sanction and coercion who are very often identical with the former.

In our effort to determine them we note first of all that the only official, hence visible tribunal that the Sarakatsani are acquainted with is that of arbiters.

[648] [179] Of course, an appeal to the official law of the surrounding society is always possible, but the Sarakatsani do not have recourse to it. (20)

20. This appeal would constitute a violation of the principle of isolation from the surrounding society, of which the Sarakatsani are very jealous.

691 692 629 [608] If the litigation concerns family questions and disagreements between members of the same family, the arbiters are recruited by the parties concerned from among the oldest relatives (uncles, for example).

[474] If the dispute is between strangers (members of the Tséligato and the head, for example), each of the parties proposes as arbiter one or two Tséligas.

The sentence, always binding and without appeal, from the viewpoint is formulated and pronounced according to what is good and fair to

/208 cont./

691 customary law on the one hand, and ex bono et aequo on the other,
692 according to circumstances and the case at hand.
629

/209/ However, the arbiters do not have any coercive powers.

Next come the family group, the Tséligato, finally surrounding society.

These groups do not form tribunals if one takes this term in its usual meaning in which the parties concerned present themselves, state their case and demand justice.

692 Nevertheless, these groups have real authority in disputes, their
629 opinion or their attitude with regard to the adversaries already con-
696 stituting a sentence. For their judgment, formulated either according to custom or spontaneously and according to the case at hand, is binding upon the person involved, inasmuch as they have means of constraint sufficient to enforce it.

It is precisely this fact which permits us to characterize these groups as agents of ajudication and to say that their opinion is a sentence.

Moreover, thay are actually empowered to execute the sentence of the arbiters.

629 Finally, in some disputes, the concerned individuals themselves may
696 make decisions and themselves apply the sanction.

The cases in which they intervene are not numerous. Custom designates the beneficiaries of this ajudication and the conditions under which they must exercise it. However, custom gives them a certain latitude in action. Thus:

694 First, the Tséligas may at any time annul his contract with one
695 of his participants and expel him forthwith if he believes the latter
697 has not properly fulfilled his obligations, In return, the participant
692 expelled may then resort to arbitration that will pronounce upon the
[686] "sufficient grounds" of this expulsion. This mechanism is much like what

/209 cont./

takes place between the commander of a ship and the members of his crew, according to maritime law. The special and comparable conditions of the life of the Tséligato and navigation on the high seas (21)

21. K. Karabida: Agroticha, pp. 39 and 47.

--a life full of diverse and unforeseeable dangers which must be faced as a group, without flinching and with the means at their disposal seem to have dictated this practice.

Second: The components of an extended family (small lineages, /210/ conjugal families, adult sons) may leave the home they share if they are satisfied with the loyality of their head.

Third: Potential participants can avoid joining a Tséligato whose head does not enjoy a good reputation.

In the first and second cases the sanction is almost inevitable since the danger of non-conformity by those responsible affects the entire community, whereas in the second and third cases it is more permissive, in view of the fact that the danger affects only sub-groups and individuals.

However, these remarks would not be complete if we did not mention the interventions of the family head or of the Tséligas to settle disputes among their subjects. These interventions sometimes take the form of arbitration, sometimes of influence through the prestige of these individuals; in both cases they are ultimately upheld by the community.

Nevertheless, in order to avoid the charge that these statements are based on "petito principii" we must now prove them objectively.

If we succeed in demonstrating that the sentences reached by arbitration, as well as the judgments and opinions of groups and individuals are obligatorily imposed on those concerned, and that the latter must conform to them without fail, we shall be demonstrating at the same time that the sentences, opinions and judgments have a legal character, that therefore they are true verdicts.

Moreover, if we prove that the arbiters, the groups and the individuals,

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629
(124)

/210 cont./
in their ajudication, prescribe obedience to the rules of the law, there will no longer be any doubt about their nature.

We shall approach this problem by examining arbitration.

Attempt at more detailed and precise investigation: In questioning our informants we learned that "the interested parties do not even think of disobeying the arbiters." Is this because, as E. Sidney Hartland (22)

22. Primitive Law/cited in English/, p. 138.--See also the view of Sir Henry Sumner Maine: Ancient Law/cited in English/, pp. 50-52 that "the habit of obedience which makes law obligatory among primitives--and even among those not politically organized." We shall come back to these problems somewhat farther on.

and with him W. Rivers and P. Lowie maintain, /211/ the primitive automatically obeys all the rules society imposes on him? Or rather is it a kind of social constraint conceived in the Durkheimian manner that operates here? Or, finally, does the agreement of the interested parties to submit their dispute to arbiters include at the same time an implicit promise to obey the sentence that will be pronounced? (23)

23. Similar to the compromissum of Roman law.

All these explanations are without doubt insufficient. The automatic obedience "of the primitive" is merely a fiction, convenient but without foundation, the frivolity of which has been criticized by Br. Malinowski (24) (and more recently by E. A. Hoebel) (25)

24. Moeurs et Coutumes des Mélanésiens, p. 17.

25. The law of primitive man /cited in English/, p. 20-21.

so convincingly that P. Lowie was obliged to give it up in a new edition of his work. (26)

26. Traité de Sociologie Primitive, p. 389.

The idea of constraint is very general and consequently too abstract to provide an explanation of this phenomenon. Finally, the "promise to obey" the arbiters would not have any practical value without a force to

/211 cont./

make sure it is fulfilled; men are always men and automatic obedience or a promise would mean nothing if carrying it out were entrusted only to the good will of those concerned.

On this point our discussions with our informants are very revealing. We were told that if the person recalcitrant to the arbiters' sentence is a member of a Tséligato, no other Tséligato would ever accept his cooperation. If he is a Tséligas, he would immediately be abandoned by all the participants and labelled "destroyer of sheepfolds" (Chalassostanis) --a name used to stigmatize a disloyal or incapable head.

The consequences of such a reaction are obvious. The one who is socially isolated, rejected by his own people, can expect only social degradation, economic ruin, exile into surrounding society. This last is his only refuge. But, since, the exiled one is not adapted to the latter he will see his condition worsen from day to day. Actually, this is enough to frighten the most courageous or the most refractory.

However, relying a little more on facts, we see that the recalcitrant one can hope for two things:

/212/ First, since he is a nomad, he can move far away from the place of arbitration and seek a setting where his behavior is not known, and be accepted there.

Second, assuming that someday his new Tséligato is informed of his conduct, there is a good chance that meanwhile he has been able to develop sufficiently close and honorable relationships with the "others" so that his unfortunate past will no longer be taken into consideration. Moreover, the absence of his adversaries permits him to give his own version of events in order to justify himself.

Now it is obvious that between the possibility of the application of envisioned punishment (which is relative) and an obedience to arbiters which is absolute (the person concerned "does not even think of disobeying") there is a discrepancy. It is difficult for us to assume that a "relative" conditioning can determine absolute effects. This shows that, in the

/212 cont./
process of obeying, other factors intervene, and that we must discover them in analyzing this phenomenon in its totality, true to the heritage of M. Mauss. (27)

27. See M. Mauss: Essai sur le don, p. 275-276.--
It is noteworthy that Malinowski, ibid., pp. 39, 41,42, in in his effort to explain the obediance of the Trobrianders to their legal customs, gives an interpretation identical to ours concerning obedience to arbiters, based on his famous "principle of reciprocity." We have explained above that this principle does not cover all of the life of law. And we shall give a more detailed critique of Malinowski's theory in one of the following sections. If we find his positions deficient it is because they are formulated according to his functionalist method which seems to us inadequate, in keeping with C. Lévi-Strauss: Introduction, p. xxxvi, who says: "Where Mauss saw a constant relationship between the phenomena as their explanation, Malinowski asks himself what they are for in order to seek a justification for them."

Every altercation between individuals is translated in actual fact into an opposition between groups. The members of the family of each interested party, bound to him by solidarity and alliance, will follow him all the more readily when disputes submitted to arbiters are of an economic order, hence handled by the head. If portions of families are set against each other in the core of the extended family or the Tséligato these groups run the danger of splitting. The principle of cooperation and solidarity is then challenged. And where, until then, peace reigned, there is threat of disorder and insecurity. Besides, the principle of the isolation of Sarakatsani from surrounding society is also endangered. For if the recalcitrant refuses to obey the arbiters, the only recourse to justice is the State, which means interference of non-Sarakatsani (formerly the occupying forces) in Sarakatsani affairs. Finally, the

629 692 183 182 696 /213/ Finally, the /213/ disobedience of arbiters means a disobedience of the custom which prescribes it. Since each partial custom is organically linked to all the others, the entire traditional cultural edifice begins to crumble.

These few consequences of disobedience to arbiters represent for the Sarakatsani a number of serious dangers. In order to avoid them it seems to us that a whole complex of reactions, influences and pressures arising from all the social forces which are affronted are set in motion for this purpose.

629 692 621 696 Under strong motivation which, in the end, is ascribable to their concern for the protection of all that is original, characteristic and essential to Sarakatsani life, individuals, sub-groups and groups, plunged into anxiety and distress, turn against the potential or actual recalcitrant, and by word, gesture and sign language, explicitly or implicitly leave him scarcely any choice. Before going on to the untimate remedy of isolation, they will bear down on him with all their might to avoid creating explosive and disastrous situations.

The recalcitrant one, in turn, is more or less aware of the pressure put upon him. His conscience has already been aroused; he is intuitive rather than reflective and extremely participative because of his firm integration in his traditional milieu. (28)

28. Margaret Mead: Cooperation and competition/cited in English/, p. 461.

(155) Moreover, his personality, molded by education which has inculcated in him respect for tradition and has developed in him the moral qualities and intellectual habits that his society demands, is definitely sensitive to influences and pressures from his associates. He therefore feels responsible for the disturbance his conduct has caused; he is well aware that everybody is waiting for him to follow the path marked out by tradition; he knows that all eyes are fixed on him; he is steeped in this suffocating atmosphere and gives way under its weight.

/213 cont./

627 Two points or view converge: microsociological and macrosociological
697 influences and pressures, on the one hand; a molding of the personality,
627 on the other. It is this double determinancy, "the internal and external
696 causality" in the apt phrase of R. Bastide, (29) that is at the base of

29. R. Bastide: La causalité externe and la causalité interne, vol. XXI, C.I.d.S., pp. 77-79.

the phenomena of obedience to arbiters, which would otherwise be inexplicable.

/214/ It matters little whether this drama is explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious. The important fact is that it exists and is effective, as is shown by the infinitesimal number of cases of isolation. (30)

30. All these methodological as well as ontological statements are drawn from the present state of research in the social sciences, which has led G. Gurvitch to speak of "total psychological phenomena" (Traité, vol. II, pp. 333-338). Unfortunately this concept is still insufficiently developed; it is drawn from many different works among which we cite the following: M. Dufrenne: La personalité de base.--R. Bastide: Sociologie et Psychoanalyse.--C. Lévi-Strauss: Anthropologie Structurale.--H. Wallon: Les origines du caractère chez l'enfant.--R. Benedict: Echantillons de civilisations.--R. Linton: The Science of man /cited in English/ and Les fondements culturels de la personnelité.--A. Kardiner: The individual and his society /cited in English/.--T. M. Newcomb: Social Psychology/cited in English/.--O. Klineberg: Psychologie sociale.--A. Kroeber: Anthropology today/cited in English/.--G. Gillin: For a science of social man/cited in English/, etc.

(113)

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626 But before we proceed further, certain questions arise: this
627 mechanism of imposing certain rules of behavior, in what way does it
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/214 cont./

626 differ from what we call "sanctions of ethnic opinion or simple dis-
627 paragement?" (31)
692

31. In the words of P. Fauconnet: La responsibilité, p. 12.

Why should we accept the fact that this same mechanism derives from law and not from the mechanism of enforcement common to all social regulations?

The reply to these two questions is the same. It is the absence of any possibility of escape, the need for all individuals to conform absolutely, the strictness of obligation which differentiates the facts described from all other kinds of sanctions. There is also the nature of the "authority" which underlies these rules and which is clearly distinguished from that of other regulations.

* * * *

627 Recourse to arbitration is infrequent. This does not mean that
692 disputes do not arise, but merely that in addition to arbitration there are other procedures leading to their settlement. These are adjudication by the family, the Tséligato and Sarakatsani society, of which we have spoken briefly when pointing out that these entities have a voice in the disputes.

Now their comments in cases of conflict may, in a way, take on the force of law and commit the persons concerned to follow a definite conduct which represents the solution of the conflict.

/215/ Their means of action are the same as those that give sanction to the decision of arbiters. However, although in the latter case the groups act in support of an arbitrated sentence, when they give their opinion they are acting on their own account.

181 That is not all. The observer of Sarakatsani life is often struck
691 by the conformism of our herders. They follow, or at any rate they seem
182 to follow, to the letter, all the regulations derived from their law--which brings us back to the statements of Rivers and Hartland cited above. This fact is very significant. For it shows another legal function of the

/215 cont./

181 groups of which we are speaking. If the latter are capable of solving
671 actual overt cases, they are equally capable of preventing potential con-
182 flicts. We believe that here is a phenomenon of major importance and /one that is/ very characteristic of Sarakatsani society and culture.

As a matter of fact, the persons involved, faced with a concrete case, know in advance the behavior they must follow, and this for two reasons. The rules of custom are known to them. Whereas in our societies law is obliged to resort to the assumption that "no one is supposed to be ignorant of the law," in traditional societies the law is part of everyday experience. (32)

32. M. Mauss: Manuel, "the intimacy of law," p. 110.

In the second place, even in case a rule does not exist--and it might then be necessary to apply a spontaneous law for the purpose--the interested parties are in a position to foresee the decision of society. Moreover, these same individuals are perfectly conscious of the fact that if they should act contrary to these expectations, they would be facing the responses of their society which would ultimately prevail. They therefore adjust their behavior accordingly. Of course, all this goes on silently. The distress and drama that this state of affairs provokes never ruffles the surface of phenomena. The observer believes there is an automatic conformism which in fact is constantly developing and which basically maintains the life style of our herders.

* * * *

627 However, the question of whether individuals actually adjudicate by
686 also applying at a sanction /216/ still remains open. By referring to
689 the concrete cases of their activity that we have judged to be legal, and examining them in the light of our preceding developments, we can reply in the affirmative. The dismissal of participants by the Tséligas, at any time, the rift in the family when the head is deemed disloyal, the lack of cooperation with a dishonest Tséligas, constitute true punishments,

/216 cont./

627 686 689 decided upon and carried out by individuals. They are variants of the major sanction, namely social isolation, the nature and importance of which we have pointed out. With respect to the removal of the head, we have nothing to say since the facts speak for themselves.

After this general survey we may conclude:

629 692 182 626 First, that it is certain that arbiters, groups and individuals determined by circumstances or by a regulation, actually perform the legal functions set forth at the beginning. They enforce and demand respect for the order dictated by the customs and general ideas of their society. The first two /arbiters and groups/ do so by relying on the group and its dynamics; the individuals close /by means of/ their own specific functions recognized by the group and supported by it when they fulfill them.

Second, that the rules of organization and functioning of Sarakatsani groups, stated above, their customs as well as what we have called "their general social ideas" take the place of rules or prescriptions of law. For, depending on the cases and the circumstances, conformity to them is required. And they are followed as a result of the mechanism of "sanction-coercion," either visible or disguised.

Sarakatsani society therefore has law and agencies of law. Though they are not always apparent, they nonetheless exist.

CRIME AND MISDEMEANORS AMONG THE SARAKATSANI.

693 694 (128) The Sarakatsani consider a certain number of acts as crimes or misdemeanors. We propose in this section to describe them, as well as to indicate the punishments associated with them and the means of which they are carried out.

Homicide and assault.

682 Respect for life and for the integrity of the body is a rule the violation of which leads to the death of the culprit.

/217/ This rule must not be considered identical with that of the penal code. A look at the situations in which it is applied will suffice

/217 cont./

682 to show the difference between them.

Thus, one who kills or wounds an opponent in the course of an open fight on equal terms (the Sarakatsani say "as is suitable for courageous men") is not prosecuted. However, if the victim is killed or wounded in 682 an unexpected attack, the murderer is exposed to blood vengeance. "the 627 blood of the dead one must be paid with blood," the Sarakatsani say. 628

It seems that if homicide in an open struggle is not punished it is because the victim has had the means to defend himself--a conception similar to the one which justifies the duel.

As for blood vengeance, its justification resides in definite social realities arising from family structure and the social life of the Sarakatsani in general.

Vengeance demands that the murderer be killed by the kinsmen of his victim. Yet the matter is not considered closed by the punishment of the guilty one. For the kinsmen of the latter must retaliate with other murders. Thus a vicious circle, that of the "vendetta," which may go on for years with many deaths on both sides is entered. It really seems that while the Sarakatsani proclaim respect for life, they forget this rule when faced with homicide, and thereupon act in a contrary manner. This is an apparently contradictory situation which may lead one to question the actual existence of this rule.

In order to understand this phenomenon it is suitable to cite two very significant cases of vendetta:

627 --Before the last world war a vendetta between two important 628 lineages from Tchépélovo in Epirus, the Tzoumanis and the Koumbis, lasted 613 several years and claimed eleven victims. In view of this situation which [581] seemed insoluable, the head, N. Tzoumanis, had the sagacity to arrange a marriage between one of his nieces and a Koumbis son. The vendetta ended forthwith.

682 627 --A young man from the region of Pélasghia (Stérea Hellas) recently

/217 cont./

682 627 killed another from there; he was arrested and condemned by the assizes of Lamia to 12 years in prison. Everybody now knows that at the end of his sentence he will be killed by the kinsmen of his victim.

[628] [602] It is appropriate to recall here the rule according to which the vendetta is not practiced when the victim and the murderer are kinsmen.

682 627 628 182 /218/ Combining these facts, we may conclude that the vendetta is not viewed merely or strictly speaking as punishment of a crime. Otherwise the kinsmen of the victim cited in our second example would not be ready to kill the culprit who had already been condemned by the law. Moreover, once the culprit is executed, and justice has therefore been done, there would be no reason for retaliation by his kinsmen. It is thus obvious that the vendetta has another purpose. It is that of re-establishing the social equilibrium, temporarily upset by the murder.

602 692 629 628 182 In the course of our study of the functions of kinship we pointed out that the "others," the non-relatives, represent virtual enemies, that therefore the family must seek at all costs to strengthen itself by enlarging the circle of kinship. By depriving it of one of its members, the murderer diminishes the family of the victim, whereas that of the culprit becomes stronger. This implies that until the moment of the crime the respective family groups are considered equal, which is no longer the case after the crime. The family of the victim must then seek to neutralize the dangerous excess number of the opposing family by diminishing it in proportion. But then the latter in turn regards itself in a bad situation. And vengeance begins all over again.

602 682 627 581 182 These assertions are corroborated by the way in which the vendetta mentioned in our first example was terminated. The Tzoumanis family gave one of its members to the Koumbis family. This exchange of individuals, by means of marriage, reestablished the equilibrium, this time positively. They /these assertions/ are likewise corroborated by the prohibition of vengeance between relatives. The family, already weakened by a homicide, must not be further weakened by new murders. (33)

/218 cont./

33. The same idea is to be found in antiquity: G. Glotz: La solidarité, p. 47-48.

Thus, there is no contradiction between the vendetta and the prohibition of homicide. If the execution of the murderer is avenged in turn that is because another principle comes into play, that of safeguarding at all costs the moral and social integrity of the family. The necessity to abide by this principle is so over whelming that the prohibition of homicide yields to it in the end.

It is true that this arrangement is not the most fortunate. However, it reflects very well the relations between the individual and /219/ the group, or rather the individual and the family, the choice in the final analysis being in favor of the group.

Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the vendetta presupposes a collective responsibility of the family groups in case of homicide: first, because they usually seek to kill the murderer himself; second, if they kill instead one of his close relatives, which is not unusual, this is not because they consider him co-responsible, but in order to weaken the family. That is why, furthermore they then choose the best, the most distinguished, the strongest.

As to the application of the vendetta, there is no procedure provided to judge the affair and to pronounce a verdict. Custom, known beforehand by all, is followed.

Carrying out the vendetta is the responsibility chiefly of the young men of the family. The women are excluded from it both as victims and executers.

Sentimental and sexual relations outside marriage.

Sarakatsani society disapproves strongly of sentimental and sexual relations outside marriage.

A statement based on Sarakatsani ideology is very indicative in this respect. According to it, cases of this kind never occur among them, as

837 /219 cont./
781 though their nature in this respect were different from that of other
579 human beings. Yet it must be acknowledged, nevertheless, that such relations are extremely rare.

579 The woman, young girl or wife, who carries on illicit relations risks
837 being put to death either by her relatives or by her husband and the
681 latter's relatives. Though marriage with the partner might possibly, if
624 rarely, let the girl escape punishment, an adulterous woman is invariably
602 punished.

Her lover too is exposed to the same punishment, the carrying out of which is incumbent on the relatives of the woman.

The Sarakatsani maintain that the justification for this severe punishment lies in the fact that the act of the woman (young girl or wife) dishonors her family or her husband and his relatives, and that only blood can wash away the stain.

Moreover, this conviction is not peculiar to our herders; one finds (191) it all over Greece. In our opinion this is an /220/ ideological sublimation (182) of two principles: that of the societal control of individuals with regard (848) to marriage, and that of the control of the legitimacy of descent, of which we have spoken above.

837 Observation shows that this belief in "wounded honor" as well as the
579 drama that it provokes recede and diminish to the extent the children, the
562 girls above all, free themselves from paternal and family authority in the
(593) matter of marriage and marry according to their own choice.
(584)

If a lover is not punished by his own relatives for his illegitimate (684) acts it is because, in a system dominated by pronounced patriarchy, the man is a privileged being to whom everything is permitted--a version obviously not acceptable to the relatives of the woman who accuse him of having ruined her.

(626) However, in such a case, the comments, regardless of who makes them, are much more severe towards the woman than towards her accomplice who

837 /220 cont./
577 "in the end is a man and is only seeking his pleasure."
577
626 Rape and abduction of a young girl.

684 These two acts are also punished with death by the relatives of the victim. But they too are extremely rare.

583 The kidnapping, the abduction of a young girl usually is a form of
584 vengeance. It happens that a suitor whose proposals have been evaded by
627 the relatives of the young girl avenges himself by carrying her off
[584] forcibly with the help of his friends.

However, if the abductor then does not consent to marry her the men of the victim's family have the duty to kill him. The justification for the punishment resides in the principles which have been set forth above.

685 The theft of animals.
[594] This act is either a crime or an exploit according to circumstances.
[613] If the thief is caught in the act he is killed on the spot by the shepherds watching their flocks. If he is identified after the deed he must give up the stolen animals in order to acquit hemself. If he refuses, he risks being either killed by the injured shepherds or of being deprived of part of his flock in retaliation.

685 /221/ However, an animal thief not caught is the subject of admiration
555 by all, even his victims. For it is not easy to carry off his exploit. In
577 order to manage it, the thief must crawl and climb, without noise in the dark of night without a moon, across gorges and rocks, elude the watch of armed shepherds, escape the scent of the terrible dogs capable of tearing him to shreds in an instant, carry off the sheep without having them bleat of sound their bells, and disappear with them silently into the night.

685 On the other hand, to steal animals in a fixed sheepfold of the winter
577 camp is a shameful act that brings disgrace to the one guilty of it.

685 Finally, this code, so to speak, regarding animal theft implies another
577 rule:
783 The thief unidentified and therefore unpunished is in any case

/235 cont./

671 of P. Radin. (44)

44. P. Radin: Le monde de l'homme primitif, p. 221 f.

671 /236/ Its sanctions guarantee its functions, at once distributive,
681 preventive, restitutive, repressive. They are not taken from the law
182 of retaliation, as the instance of the vendetta particularly demonstrates.
(627) They are based on the idea of the defense of the social equilibrium or its reestablishment if it is temporarily disrupted.

Thanks to the mechanism of disguised coercion, it acquires, citing the expression of Mauss, (45)

45. Manuel, p. 110.

a character of strongly felt intimacy and community, for it can become involved at any moment in the smallest details of the life of our herders.

671 Seemingly simple, if not simplistic, but basically very complex,
182 Sarakatsani law meets the need for social control with extreme efficacy, which one would not dispute if one looked closely at its social context. For the dynamics of Sarakatsani law, transmitted in the social framework to a large extent give it its stability.

/237/

CHAPTER IV

MORAL PHENOMENA AND MORALITY AMONG THE SARAKATSANI

577 Morality among the Sarakatsani is neither systematized nor doctrinal.
121 It is bound up with many aspects of their lives, in symbols, attitudes, conduct, habits, customs, language, cultural works, all of which serve as its vehicles. (1)

1. This phenomenon is not peculiar to the Sarakatsani alone. See A. Bayet: La science des faits moeurs, p. 17.

In attempting to recognize it and make it clear, the problem of an operational criterion of procedure arises. "In order to observe the moral phenomenon, one must also know what characterizes it, by what distinctive mark it can be recognized," Durkheim (2)

/397 cont./

578 It is possible that conjugal families or small lineages will one day find themselves in competition or in conflict with each other or with the extended family of which they are a part or with both at the same time.

The many causes of competition may be classified into two categories:

Occasional causes reflecting conflicts /398/ arising from a specific combination of circumstances, as for example, personal discord between heads or other members of the sub-groups of the family unit (dislikes, jealousies, disputes, rancor, hatred, etc.), disagreements about the managament or because of the managament of the common enterprise, ambitions of a sub-group's head who aspires to become an independent head, etc.

578 627 182 The means at the disposal of Sarakatsani society to cope with this are both manifold and effective: in case of discord or personal ambitions, the individuals concerned may demand their "share" of the common goods and leave, or else join another Tsáligato. Likewise, economic disagreements may be solved either by arbitration or by the dismissal of an incapable head-manager, or finally by splitting up and dispersing. At worst, the original family group may find itself lessened in strength or even split up. But in general the means of bypassing differences, true safety values, channel the pressures in directions provided for, and avoid a challenge to the adopted way of life, as would be the case if the explosive situations did not have another outlet.

578 Causes inherent in the very system of Sarakatsani life, reflecting social conflicts that derive from its inherent characteristics. It is chiefly this second category of rivalries which, as constant dangers to the equilibrium, merit our attention.

[121] As a matter of fact, according to a correct but very much disputed formula by C. Lévi-Strauss, "no society is perfect. Each one has by